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Point 1 
The only question before this 
Court is whether the vuit Claim 
Deed of plaintiff in 1945 carried 
the after acquired interest of 
plaintiff,vhich he obtained in 1950 
whereby he would be estopped from 
setting up title which he obtained 
later by the decree of distribution 
as hereinabove set forth, in the 
absence of any showing of fraud or 
misrepresentation.· •. . . . . 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
CASES CITED 
Telonis vs. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2nd 513 _____ -··-············ 3 
Equitable Life and Casualty vs. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 
144 p. 526·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
Williams vs. Barney, 224 P. 2nd 1042·-----------------------------------·--··· 5 
U.S. National Bank of LeGrande vs. Arthur Ben Miller, 
122 Ore. 285, 285 Pac. 205 (1927), 58 A.L.R. 339 at 
page 344 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Woodside vs. Bertha Durham, No. 295 S.W. 722 (1927), 
535 A.L.R. 844·------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Rowell vs. Rowell, Mont. (1946), 174 P. 2nd 223________________________ 7 
TEXT CITED 
19 American Juris, Page 617, No. 19·------------------------------------------- 4 
58 A.L.R. 339, Page 344------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
58 A.L.R. 360·------------------------------------------------------------------------------·-··· 6 
5'8 A.L.R. 362·---····-·-·----------·-----------·-------------·-···-·---······---·---·····--······ 6 
16 American Jurisprudence, page 637, Sec. No. 344.................... 6 
174 P. 2nd 223.·--------··--·--·····-·-···--··-···-···················-························· 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. W. DOWSE, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED D. KAMMERMAN and 
VAUGHAN D. KAMMERMAN, 
doing business as KAMMER-
MAN COMPANY, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7719 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which plaintiff, hereinafter 
called respondent, commenced an action in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, against defendant, herein-
after called appellant, to quiet title to certain land 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and de-
scribed as Lot 7, Block 1, Holland Subdivision. 
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Defendants and appellants herein set up title based 
upon a warranty deed which they had procured from 
the Doris Trust Company. The Doris Trust Company 
had in turn received the Quit Claim Deed from respond-
ent who at the time of said conveyance held a tax deed 
to the land from Salt Lake County. The title to the 
premises was originally held by one Charles E. Pittorf, 
who held the property from February 26, 1907. In 
1930 the taxes were not paid and on December 22, 1930 
the County Treasurer of Salt Lake County executed a 
tax sale to Salt Lake County. The taxes for the years 
1931 to 1934 inclusive were added and on March 31, 
1936, an Auditor's Tax deed was issued to Salt Lake 
County. 
On April 24, 1945, Salt Lake County conveyed the 
property to 8. W. Dowse, who with Pearl B. Dowse, his 
wife, on the 13th day of June, 1945, conveyed to 'Doris 
Trust Company, Doris Trust Company thereafter deeded 
to appellants. 
Thereafter on March 14, 1950 respondent Dowse 
obtained quit claim deeds from the heirs of Charles E. 
Pittorf who, it appears, had died July 12, 1912. There-
after, the estate of Charles E. Pittorf was probated 
and the estate distributed to respondent Dowse as the 
assignee of the heirs of Charles E. Pittorf. 
These facts were stipulated to by the parties at 
the time of trial, and in addition it was stipulated that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ir~ 
3 
the Auditor's affidavit was missing fro1n the tax assess-
ment and the tax sale upon whieh the tax deed was 
predicated was Yoid and defectiYe as heretofore decided 
by this Honorable Court in the case of Telonis vs. Staley, 
104: Utah 537, 14:4: P. 2nd 513, and Equitable Life and 
Casualty Ys. Schoeu·e, 105 _Utah 569, 144: P. 526. 
Based upon this defective tax deed through which 
defendants claim title the Court found the issues in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, but ordered 
plaintiff to reimburse defendants in the sum of $105.57, 
the amount paid by defendants and predecessors in 
interest, to wit, the Doris Trust Company. Plaintiff 
thereupon paid said amount and was granted a decree 
quieting title to the land mentioned in his complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent in answer to appellants' statement of 
:::: errors relied upon, is unable to separately answer the 
three so-called statements of errors relied upon as set 
forth by appellants, inasmuch as they all resolve them-
selves into one. 
. / 
The only question before this Court is whether 
the Quit Claim Deed of plaintiff in 1945 carried the 
after acquired interest of plaintiff, which he obtained 
in 1950, whereby he would be estopped from setting 
up title which he obtained later by the decree of dis-
tribution as hereinabove set forth, in the absence of any 
showing of fraud or misrepresentation. 
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Appellants in their brief at page 5 quote from 
19 Am. Jur. at page 601 that no estoppel arises from a 
.Quit Claim Deed and state that appellants accept the 
general statement of the law on the subject as quoted, 
· but add that "special factual situation" as set forth 
in the case at bar should apply to change this statement. 
Then appellants cite a number of cases where equi-
table estoppel was applied to prevent a person from 
recovering where he had not acted in good faith or 
had been guilty of some kind of improper conduct. 
Contrary to appellants' inferences, nothing appears 
from the evidence or anywhere in the record of this 
case wherein it would appear that plaintiff conducted 
himself improperly in obtaining the decree of distribu-
tion. Further, there is no evidence that plaintiff in 
1945 knew of the whereabouts of Pittorf or any of his 
heirs, when he obtained the defective tax title from 
Salt Lake County, and after two months sold it to Doris 
. Trust Company, the grantor of Appellants herein. If 
the plaintiff had had any such knowledge of the where-
abouts of Charles E. Pittorf or any of his heirs in 
1945 and that fact appeared anywhere in the record 
or evidence, appellants might have a basis for their 
contention that plaintiff did not act in good faith; but 
nothing of that kind is shown. 
19 American Juris, page 617, No. 19 : 
"Effect of Quit-Claim. As a general rule, a 
quit clai1n deed, not affirming, either ex~ressly 
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or by implication, the existence of any estate or 
interest in the grantor, does not estop him from 
asserting an after acquired title or interest. 
Since a Quit Claim Deed as such purports to 
grant only the estate or interest, the addition 
of a 'varranty against the grantor or those 
claiming by, through or under him, will not 
estop the grantor to assert a title subsequently 
acquired, assuming that it is not derived through 
any act or conveyance of his own prior to the 
deed in question. On the other hand, if a quit 
claim deed contains recitals or evidences an in-
tention to convey a particular interest, it may 
operate by way of estoppel." 
In the recent case of Williams vs. Barney, 224 P. 
2nd 10-12, decided by this Honorable Court November 
29, 1950, it was held that it did not appear that de-
fendant had relied upon any representation of plain-
tiff's predecessor in interest in the purchase of the tax 
title and therefore the doctrine of estoppel would not 
apply. 
In U. 8. National Bank of LeGrande vs. Arthur 
Ben Miller, 122 Ore. 285, 285 Pac. 205 ( 1927), 58 A.L.R. 
339 at page 344: 
"In order to estop a grantor from claiming 
an after acquired title, the grant must contain 
references or representations which he is com-
pelled to repudiate in order to assert his after 
acquired title." 
Defendant in the instant case is not disputing any 
recital or representations in his deed under which plain-
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tiff' claims. That deed conveyed all the interest plaintiff 
had in the premises described therein at the time it was 
made. Defendant is not claiming anything contradicting 
that deed. 
This point 1s reviewed at length in 58 A.L.R. 360 
(note) as follows: 
"The general rule is well established that, 
if a deed does not purport, by express terms or 
by implication, to convey a particular estate, but 
only the grantor's title or interest, in other words, 
if the conveyance is merely by quit claim deed, 
and there are no covenants or recitals showing 
any intention to convey any definite interest or 
estate, the grantor is not thereby estopped from 
asserting an after acquired title or interest." 
(See cases collected in 58 A.L.R. 360, et seq.) 
Further, 58 A.L.R. 362 : 
"Thus although an ordinary quit claim deed 
will not estop the grantor from asserting an after-
acquired interest, yet a distinct recital in such 
a deed showing that the parties proceeded on the 
theory that a particular interest was thereby 
conveyed may be as effectual to create an estop-
pel as a warranty." 
In 16 American Jurisprudence, page 637, Sec. No. 
344, it is stated as follows : 
"It is well established that a mere quit claim 
deed, by which the grantor professes to convey 
only such interest as existed in him at the time 
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of the execution of the instrument, without affirm-
ing, either expressly or by ilnplication the exist-
ence of any estate or interest in hilnself does not 
ilnport that the grantor possesses any interest at 
all and is ineffectual either by force of an estop-
pel or otherwise, to pass the grantee any title 
or right acquired by the grantor subsequent to 
the execution of such quit claim deed. In other 
words, a quit claim does not so operate that a 
title acquired by the grantor subsequently there-
to will inure to the grantee. Moreover, if a deed 
does not affirm or purport to convey any par-
ticular estate, a covenant of warranty will be 
regarded as referring merely to the grantor's 
existing interest and will not estop him from 
asserting an after acquired title. It has been so 
held even as to a quit claim in which the habendum 
clause would have passed a fee if the grantor 
had at the time possessed such an estate." 
In Rowell vs. Rowell, Mont. (1946), 174 P. 2nd 223, 
the Court held : 
"A grantee is estopped to assert an after 
acquired title only where such assertion would 
involve the denial that the conveyance passed the 
interest or estate which it purported to pass." 
Again in Woodside vs. Bertha Durham, Mo., 295 
S.W. 772 (1927), 535 A.L.R. 884: 
"An equitable estoppel does not arise from 
any act or conduct unless it is relied upon by 
another who is thereby caused to change his 
situation or to suffer detriment or losses." 
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If the deed by Respondent to the Doris Trust Com-
pany expressly or impliedly indicated an intention to 
pass any after acquired title which he might have ob-
tained, then and in that event the position of appellant 
would have merit. This does not appear from the evi-
dence however, and we submit that the whole transac-
tion was one in which the seller Doris Trust Company 
received what it bargained for. Further, there is no 
evidence to show that Respondent at the time of such 
conveyance knew or had any knowledge concerning the 
whereabouts of Pittorf, and that such information was 
withheld from the purchaser, Doris Trust Company. 
There is no showing of any fraud or deceit at any 
time on the part of Respondent Dowse and by the simple 
doctrine of caveal emptor appellant knew or should 
have known what he was buying when he received the 
quit claim deed from Respondent Dowse. 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore submit in conclusion that appellants 
have wholly failed to show any evidence of fraud, mis-
representation or any reliance upon any statement or 
conduct of respondent which induced Doris Trust Com-
pany, the predecessor in interest of plaintiff to make 
such purchase from said respondent, whereby such con-
veyance would come within the rule of exceptions to 
Quit Claim Deeds. Therefore and in the absence of 
such showing and in view of the numerous decisions 
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9 
upon the subject, son1e of which are hereinabove men-
tioned, we respectfully urge that the judgment be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LA~IAR DUNCAN, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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